Robert E. Lee
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(CIVIL WAR.) ROBERT E. LEE. Brief Autograph Letter Signed, "RELee / Comm'g Gen'l," to Colonel Christopher Q. Tompkins: "In answer to your letter of the 19 Inst't enclosing certain papers therein referred to, I find it very necessary to state that you did right in obeying the orders of Gen'l Floyd." 1/2 page, 4to, ruled paper; small hole at left edge with minor loss to text, faint scattered foxing, docketing on verso, horizontal folds. "H'd Q'rs Valley Mt," 21 August 1861
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General-in-Chief
Armies
of the Confederate States of America
LEE, Robert Edward, soldier, born in Stratford, Westmoreland County, Virginia, 19 Jan., 1807; died in Lexington, Virginia, 12 Oct., 1870. He was the son of the Revolutionary general Henry Lee (q. v.), known as " Light-Horse Harry," was graduated from the U. S. military academy at West Point in 1829, ranking second in a class of forty-six, and was commissioned as a 2d lieutenant in the engineers.
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| Robert E. Lee as Lieutenant of Engineers, U. S. Army in 1838 |
At the beginning of the Mexican war he was assigned to duty as
chief engineer of the army under General Wool, his rank being
that of captain. His abilities as an engineer, and his conduct as
a soldier, won the special admiration of General Scott, who
attributed the fall of Vera Cruz to his skill, and repeatedly
singled him out for commendation. Lee was thrice brevetted during
the war, his last brevet to the rank of colonel being for
services at the storming of Chapultepec.
In 1852 he was assigned to the command of the military academy at
West Point, where he remained for about three years. He brought
great improvements in the academy, notably enlarging its course
of study and bringing it to a rank equal to that of the best
European military schools.
In 1855 he was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the 2d regiment of cavalry, and assigned to duty on the Texan frontier, where he remained until near the beginning of the civil war, with the exception of an interval when, in 1859, he was ordered to Washington and placed in command of the force that was sent against John Brown at Harper's Ferry.
In 1855 he was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the 2d regiment of cavalry, and assigned to duty on the Texan frontier, where he remained until near the beginning of the civil war, with the exception of an interval when, in 1859, he was ordered to Washington and placed in command of the force that was sent against John Brown at Harper's Ferry.
After the election of President Abraham Lincoln in 1860, South
Carolina broke away from the Union. This was followed early
the next year by Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, and Texas. These states viewed President Lincoln as a
threat to slavery, labeling him a "Black Republican."
However, when Virginia delegates began talks in February, a
conservative tone prevailed, and a preliminary vote for secession
failed. As the South's most populous state—and the richest in
natural resources—the decision of the Old Dominion was a
momentous one for the future of the Confederacy.
In President Lincoln's inaugural address of March 4th, he promised not to interfere with slavery in the states where it existed but condemned secession, stating that "the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy." Virginians wondered what fate would befall the Deep South states, and what the implications might be of a strong Federal government. The debates continued until April 15th, when Richmond newspapers reported Lincoln's call for 75,000 troops to suppress the uprising. As a member of the Union, Virginia would be required to send 2,340 soldiers. This proved to be the breaking point for delegates, and the convention chose to stand with other southerners and vote for secession.
On 20 April, 1861, three days after the Virginia convention adopted an ordinance of secession, he resigned his commission, in obedience to his conscientious conviction that he was bound by the act of his state. His only authenticated expression of opinion and sentiment on the subject of secession is found in the following passage from a letter written at the time of his resignation to his sister, the wife of an officer in the National army;
In President Lincoln's inaugural address of March 4th, he promised not to interfere with slavery in the states where it existed but condemned secession, stating that "the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy." Virginians wondered what fate would befall the Deep South states, and what the implications might be of a strong Federal government. The debates continued until April 15th, when Richmond newspapers reported Lincoln's call for 75,000 troops to suppress the uprising. As a member of the Union, Virginia would be required to send 2,340 soldiers. This proved to be the breaking point for delegates, and the convention chose to stand with other southerners and vote for secession.
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| On 13 February 1861 the Virginia secession convention assembled in Richmond. Called for by a special session of the General Assembly, the group convened to determine whether Virginia should secede from the Union. Although the 152 delegates gathered in the capitol that first day, most of their meetings took place in the Virginia Mechanic's Institute, at the corner of Ninth and Franklin streets. On April 16th, the delegates met in secrecy, passing the Ordinance of Secession the next day. The citizens of Virginia ratified the ordinance on May 23rd. |
On 20 April, 1861, three days after the Virginia convention adopted an ordinance of secession, he resigned his commission, in obedience to his conscientious conviction that he was bound by the act of his state. His only authenticated expression of opinion and sentiment on the subject of secession is found in the following passage from a letter written at the time of his resignation to his sister, the wife of an officer in the National army;
"We are now in a state of war which will yield to nothing. The whole south is in a state of revolution, into which Virginia, after a long struggle, has been drawn; and though I recognize no necessity for this state of things, and would have forborne and pleaded to the end for redress of grievances, real or supposed, yet in my own person I had to meet the question whether I should take part against my native state. With all my devotion to the Union, and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home. I have therefore resigned my commission m the army, and, save in defense of my native state--with the sincere hope that my poor services may never be needed--I hope I may never be called upon to draw my sword."
Repairing to Richmond, he was made commander-in-chief of the
Virginia state forces, and in May, 1861, when the Confederate
government was removed from Montgomery to Richmond, he was
appointed a full general under that government. During the early
months of the war he served inconspicuously in the western part
of Virginia. In the autumn Lee was sent to the coast of South
Carolina, where he planned, and in part constructed, the
defensive lines that successfully resisted all efforts directed
against them until the very end of the war. He was ordered to
Richmond, and on 13 March, 1862, assigned to duty "under
the direction of the president," and "charged
with the conduct of military operations in the armies of the
Confederacy."
Students and Teachers of US History this is a video of Stanley and Christopher Klos presenting America's Four United Republics Curriculum at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School. The December 2015 video was an impromptu capture by a member of the audience of Penn students, professors and guests that numbered about 200.
The campaign of the preceding year in Virginia had embraced but
one battle of importance, that of Bull Run or Manassas, and the
Confederate success there had not been followed by anything more
active than an advance to Centreville and Fairfax Court House,
with advanced posts on Mason's and Munson's hills. Meantime
McClellan had been engaged in reorganizing the National army, and
converting the raw levies into disciplined troops. When he was
finally ready to advance, the Confederates retired to the south
side of the Rappahannock, and when McClellan transferred his base
to Fort Monroe and advanced upon Richmond by way of the
peninsula, General Joseph E. Johnston removed his army to
Williamsburg, leaving Jackson's division in the valley and
Ewell's on the line of the Rappahannock.
Johnston fell back in May to make his stand in defense of
Richmond immediately in front of the town. McClellan advanced to
a line near the city with his army of more than 100,000 men, and,
under the mistaken impression that Johnston's force outnumbered
his own, waited for McDowell, who was advancing with 40,000 men
from the neighborhood of Fredericksburg to join him. To prevent
the coming of this re-enforcement, Lee ordered Ewell to join
Jackson, and directed the latter to attack Banks in the valley of
the Shenandoah, drive him across the Potomac, and thus seem to
threaten Washington city. Jackson executed the task assigned him
with such celerity and success as to cause serious apprehension
in Washington. McDowell was recalled, and the re-enforcement of
McClellan was prevented. The latter now established himself on
the Chickahominy, with a part of his army thrown across that
stream. A flood came at the end of May, and, believing that the
swollen river effectually isolated this force, General Johnston
attacked it on 31 May, hoping to crush it before assistance could
reach it from the northern side of the river. Thus resulted the
battle of Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, in which Johnston was
seriously wounded and rendered unfit for further service for a
time. McClellan fortified his lines, his left wing lying near
White Oak Swamp, on the south of the Chickahominy, his right
extending up the river to Mechanicsville, and his depot being at
the White House on the York river railroad and the Pamunkey
River.
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Now, for the first time, General Lee had direct command of a
great army confronting an enemy strongly posted, and his capacity
as a strategist 'and commander was first demonstrated in that
bloody and brilliant, but only in part successful, series of
maneuvers and contests known as "the seven days'
battle." He determined to adopt that offensive defense
which was always his favorite method. Instead of awaiting
McClellan's attack, he resolved to defend Richmond by dislodging
the foe that threatened it. His plan was secretly to bring
Jackson's force to his aid, and, while holding McClellan in check
on the south side of the river with a part of his force securely
entrenched, to transfer the rest of it to the north side, turn
the enemy's flank, and move down the river in his rear,
threatening his communications and compelling him to quit his
entrenchments for a battle in the open, or to abandon his
position altogether and retreat. The first necessity was to
fortify the lines south of the river, and when that was done,
General J. E. B. Stuart, with a cavalry column, was sent to march
around McClellan's position, ascertain the condition of the roads
in his rear, and gather such other information as was needed.
Jackson, with his entire force, was brought to Ashland, on the
Fredericksburg railroad, from which point he was to move on 25
June to the neighborhood of Atlee's Station, and turn the enemy's
positions at Mechanicsville and Beaver Dam on the next day. A. P.
Hill's division was to cross the river at Meadow Bridge as soon
as Jackson's movement should uncover it, and Longstreet and D. H.
Hill were to cross in their turn when the passage should be
clear. There was a delay of one day in Jackson's movement,
however, so that he did not turn the position at Beaver Dam until
the 27th. A. P. Hill, after waiting until the afternoon of the
26th for the movement of Jackson to accomplish the intended
purpose, pushed across the river at Meadow Bridge and drove out
the force that occupied Mechanicsville. Longstreet and D. H. Hill
also crossed, and the next morning the works at Beaver Dam were
turned and the Confederates pushed forward in their march down
the river, Jackson in advance with D. H. Hill for support, while
Longstreet and A. P. Hill were held in reserve, and upon the
right, to attack McClellan in flank and rear, should he seriously
oppose Jackson's advance toward the York river railroad. There
was some miscarriage of plans, due to a mistake in Jackson's
movement, and, in consequence, Longstreet and Hill encountered
the right wing of McClellan's force in a strong position near
Gaines's Mills before the advance under Jackson was engaged at
all.
The resistance of the National troops was stubborn, and it was
not until after Jackson came up and joined in the conflict that
the position was forced. The National troops suffered severely,
and were finally driven across the river. Lee now commanded
McClellan's communications, and no course was open to the
National general but to save his army by a retreat to the James
river, during which severe battles were fought at Savage's
Station and Frazier's Farm. The series of maneuvers and battles
ended in a fierce conflict at Malvern Hill, where the
Confederates suffered terribly in a series of partial and
ill-directed assaults upon a strong position taken by the
retreating foe. The bloody repulses thus inflicted consoled the
retreating army somewhat for their disaster, but could not repair
the loss of position already suffered or do more than delay the
retreat. The operations outlined above had brought McClellan's
movement against Richmond to naught, and their moral effect was
very great; but Lee was convinced that he had had and lost an
opportunity to compel the actual surrender of his enemy, though
stronger than himself in numbers, and regarded McClellan's escape
upon any terms as a partial failure of his plans, due to
accidental miscarriages.
Having driven McClellan from his position in front of Richmond,
and having thus raised what was in effect the siege of that city,
General Lee's desire was to transfer the scene of operations to a
distance from the Confederate capital, and thus relieve the
depression of the southern people which had followed the general
falling back of their armies and the disasters sustained in the
west. McClellan lay at Harrison's Landing, below Richmond, with
an army that was still strong, and while the Confederate capital
was no longer in immediate danger, the withdrawal of the army
defending it would invite attack and capture unless McClellan's
withdrawal at the same time could be forced. For effecting that,
Lee calculated upon the apparently excessive concern felt at the
north for the safety of Washington. If he could so dispose of his
forces as to put Washington in actual or seeming danger, he
was confident that McClellan's army would be speedily
recalled.
In the mean time, General John Pope, in command of another
National army, had advanced by way of the Orange and Alexandria
railroad, with the purpose of effecting a junction with McClellan
and it was necessary to meet the danger from that quarter without
exposing Richmond, as already explained; for if the people of the
north laid excessive stress upon the preservation of Washington
from capture, the people of the south held Richmond in a like
sentimental regard. Jackson was ordered, on 13 July, to
Gordonsville with his own and Ewell's divisions, and he moved
thence to Orange Court House, where A. P. Hill was ordered to
join him at the end of the month. With this force Jackson crossed
the Rapidan, attacked a part of Pope's army at Cedar Mountain on
9 Aug., and gained an advantage, holding the ground until Pope
advanced in force two days later, when he retired to the south of
the river.
Lee now hurried troops forward as rapidly as possible, and on 14
Aug. took personal command on the Rapidan. His force was
slightly superior to Pope's, and, as the National commander
seemed at that time unaware of the presence of the main body of
the Confederate army, Lee hoped, by a prompt attack, to take him
somewhat unprepared. The movement was planned for 19 Aug., but
there was a delay of a day, and in the mean time Pope had become
aware of his danger and withdrawn behind the Rappahannock, where
he had posted his army in a strong position to oppose a crossing.
Finding the advantage of position to be with the enemy, Lee moved
up the river, Pope keeping pace with him until a point near
Warrenton Springs was reached. There Lee halted and made a
demonstration as if to cross, on 24 Aug., while Jackson, crossing
about eight miles above, made a rapid march around Bull Run
Mountain and through Thoroughfare Gap, to gain the enemy's rear.
The movement was completely successful, and on the 26th Jackson
reached Manassas Junction, capturing the supply depots there. As
soon as Pope discovered the movement he withdrew to protect his
communications. Longstreet at once marched to join Jackson,
following the same route and effecting a junction on the morning
of 29 Aug., on the same field on which the first battle of
Manassas or Bull Run was fought in 1861. Pope's army, re-enforced
from McClellan's, was in position, and battle was joined that
afternoon. The National assaults upon Lee's lines on that day and
the next were determined but unsuccessful, and on 30 Aug. the
Confederates succeeded in driving their enemy across Bull Run to
Centreville. Lee, re-enforced, turned the position on 1 Sept.,
and Pope retired toward Washington.
The way was now clear for the further offensive operations that
Lee contemplated. The transfer of McClellan's invading force to
Washington had been made imperative, and Lee's army, encouraged
by success, was again filled with that confidence in itself and
its leader which alone can make an army a fit tool with which to
undertake aggressive enterprises. He determined to transfer the
scene of operations to the enemy's territory. The plan involved
the practical abandonment of his communications so far as the
means of subsisting his army was concerned, but the region into
which he planned to march was rich in food and forage, and, with
the aid of his active cavalry under Stuart, he trusted to his
ability to live upon the country. The movement was begun at once,
and on 5 Sept. the army, 45.000 strong, crossed the Potomac and
took up a position near Frederick, Md., from which it might move
at will against Washington or Baltimore or invade Pennsylvania. A
strong garrison of National troops still held Harper's Ferry, to
Lee's surprise and somewhat to the disturbance of his plans, as
it was necessary for him to have the route to the valley of
Virginia open to his ammunition trains. On 10 Sept., therefore,
he directed Jackson to return to the south side of the river and
advance upon Harper's Ferry from the direction of Martinsburg
while McLaws should seize Maryland Heights, Walker hold Loudon
Heights, and D. H. Hill post himself at Boonsboro' Pass to
prevent the escape of the garrison. Having made these
dispositions, Lee moved to Hagerstown to collect subsistence and
to await the capture of Harper's Ferry by his lieutenant, after
which the several divisions were to unite at Boonsboro' or
Sharpsburg, as occasion should determine.
McClellan was at this time advancing at the head of the National
army from Washington, but with unusual deliberation. By one of
those mishaps which play so large a part in military operations,
a copy of Lee's order, giving minute details of his dispositions
and plans, fell into McClellan's hands, and that general, thus
fully apprised of the exact whereabouts of every subdivision of
Lee's temporarily scattered forces, made haste to take advantage
of his adversary's unprepared situation. Making a rapid march, on
14 Sept. he fell upon D. H. Hill's division at Boonsboro' Pass.
Hill resisted stubbornly and held his ground until assistance
arrived. During the night Lee withdrew to Sharpsburg, where news
soon reached him of the surrender of Harper's Ferry with about
11,000 men and all its stores. By the 16th the army was again
united, except that A. P. Hill's division had remained at
Harper's Ferry to care for the prisoners and stores. Meantime
McClellan had reached Sharpsburg also, and on the 17th battle was
joined. (For an account of tile battle, see McClellan.)
Neither side having gained a decisive victory, neither was
disposed to renew the contest on the lath, and the day was passed
in inactivity. During the night following Lee re-crossed the
Potomac and marched to the neighborhood of Winchester, where he
remained until late in October, the enemy also remaining inactive
until that time, when Lee retired to the line of the
Rappahannock. The conflict at Sharpsburg or Antietam is called a
drawn battle, and it was such if we consider only the immediate
result. Neither army overcame the other or gained a decisive
advantage, and neither was in condition, at the end of the
affair, to make effective pursuit should the other retire. But
McClellan had had the best of it in the fight, and Lee's invasion
of northern territory was brought to an end; the battle was thus
in effect a victory for the National arms. On the other hand, if
we include tile capture of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, Lee
had inflicted greater loss upon the enemy than he had himself
suffered. So far as the definite objects with which he had
undertaken the campaign were concerned, it had been successful.
Richmond had been relieved of present danger. The moral situation
had been reversed for a time. From standing on the defensive, and
hard pressed in front of their own capital, the Confederates had
been able to march into their enemy's country, overthrowing an
army on their way, and to put the National capital upon its
defense. The spirits of the southern army and people were
revived, and from that time until the last hour of the war the
confidence of both in the skill of their commander was implicit
and unquestioning. Lee was thenceforth their reliance and the
supreme object of their devotion.
General Burnside, having succeeded McClellan in command of the
National army, adopted a new plan of campaign that should
threaten Richmond by an advance over a short line, and at the
same time keep Washington always covered. He made his base upon
the Potomac at Acquia Creek. and planned to cross the
Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. The head of his column reached
Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, on 17 Nov. Lee moved promptly
to meet this new advance, and occupied a line of hills in rear of
the town, which commanded the plain below and afforded excellent
conditions for defense. Here he posted about half his army, under
Longstreet, while D. H.. Hill was at Port Royal, twenty miles
below, and Jackson lay between, prepared to support either wing
that might be attacked. Lee's total force numbered about 80,000
men of all arms; Burnside's about 120,000, of whom 100,000 were
thrown across the river on the day of the battle.
The crossing was made on 12 Dec. in two columns, the one at
Fredericksburg and the other three miles below. No serious
opposition was made to the crossing, it being Lee's plan to await
attack in his strong position on the crests of the hills rather
than risk an action in the plain below. Burnside spent the 12th
in preparation, and did not advance to the assault until the next
morning about ten o'clock. Two points of attack were chosen, one
upon the Confederate right, the other upon the left. The attack
upon the Confederate right was for a time successful, breaking
through the first line of defense at a weak point, but it was
quickly met and repelled by Jackson, who had hurried to the point
of danger. The National troops were forced back and pressed
almost to the river, where a heavy artillery fire checked
Jackson's pursuit, and upon his return to the original line of
defense the battle in that quarter ended in Confederate success,
but with about equal losses to the two armies.
On the other side of the field the assaults were repeated and
determined, and resulted in much graver loss to the assailants
and much less damage to the Confederates. The nature of the
ground forbade all attempts to turn Lee's left, and the National
troops had no choice but to make a direct advance upon Marye's
Heights. Here Lee was strongly posted with artillery so placed as
to enfilade the line of advance. A little in front of his main
line, and on the side of the hill below, lay a sunken road,
flanked by a stone wall running athwart the line of the National
advance, and forming a thoroughly protected ditch. Into this road
about 2,000 infantry had been thrown, and Burnside's columns, as
they made their successive advances up a narrow field, swept by
the artillery from above, came suddenly upon this concealed and
well-protected force, and encountered a withering fire of
musketry at short range, which swept them back. The nature of the
obstacle was not discovered by the National commanders, and
assault after assault was made, always with the same result,
until the approach of night put an end to the conflict. The next
day Lee waited for the renewal of the assault, which he had
repelled with a comparatively small part of his force, but,
although Burnside remained on the Confederate side of the river,
he made no further attempt to force his adversary's position. He
had lost nearly 13,000 men, while Lee's loss was but a little
more than 5,000. The National army re-crossed the river on the
15th, and military operations were suspended for the winter.
General Joseph Hooker,
who succeeded Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac,
planned a spring campaign, the purpose of which was to force Lee
out of his entrenched position at Fredericksburg and overcome him
in the field. His plan of operations was to throw a strong
detachment across the river below Fredericksburg, threatening an
assault upon the works there, while with the main body of his
army he should cross the river into the region known as the
Wilderness above the Confederate position, thus compelling Lee to
move out of his entrenchments and march to meet his advance at
Chancellorsville. Lee's army had been weakened by detachments to
57,000 men, while Hooker's strength was about 120,000, and the
National commander hoped to compel the further division of his
adversary's force by occupying a part of it at Fredericksburg.
The plan was admirably conceived, and no operation of the war so
severely tested the skill of Lee or so illustrated his character
as did the brief campaign that followed.
About the end of April, 1863, the plan was put in operation.
Sedgwick, with 30,000 men, crossed below Fredericksburg, while
Hooker, with the main body, crossed at the fords above and
marched through the Wilderness to gain a position upon the
Confederate flank. Leaving about 9,000 men in the works at
Fredericksburg, Lee marched on 1 May to meet Hooker's advance,
which he encountered near Chancellorsville. He attacked the
advance force at once, and it retired upon the main body, which
occupied a strong position and seemed disposed to act upon the
defensive. Notwithstanding the great inferiority of his force
(48,000 men), Lee decided upon the hazardous experiment of
dividing it. Retaining about 12,000 or 14,000 men with whom to
make a demonstration in front, he sent Jackson with the
remainder of the army to march around Hooker's right flank and
strike him in the rear. The maneuver was extremely hazardous, but
was made necessary by the situation, and was fully justified by
its success. Jackson made his march without discovery of his
purpose, and, late in the afternoon of 2 May, came upon Hooker's
rear with a suddenness and determination that threw a part of the
National army into confusion and gave the Confederates a great
advantage.
The contest lasted until after nightfall, and the armies lay upon
their arms throughout the night. Jackson having received a mortal
wound from the fire of his own men, the command of his force
devolved upon Stuart, who renewed the attack early next day and
pressed it with vigor until about ten o'clock, when a junction
was formed with the troops under Lee, operating from in front.
The whole line then advanced with great impetuosity, under the
immediate command of General Lee. and the enemy was driven with
great loss from the field, retiring to the works that defended
the river crossings. Meantime Sedgwick had carried the
position at Fredericksburg, and was advancing on Lee's right
flank. He had reached a point within six miles of
Chancellorsville before forces detached for the purpose could
check his advance.
On the next day Early came up, and Lee succeeded in driving
Sedgwick across the river. A storm interfered with plans for
pressing Hooker's retreat, and by the 6th he had withdrawn
completely from the southern side of the river, and was resuming
his position opposite Fredericksburg. Lee also returned to his
works, facing the enemy, with the river between. It was now
incumbent upon General Lee to determine, so far as the matter was
within his control, where and how the campaign of the approaching
summer should be carried on. his policy was in a general sense
defensive, but it was open to him to choose between a rigid
adherence to that policy and the adoption of offensive measures
with a defensive intent. He wished to avoid the depressing moral
effect of a second near approach of the enemy to Richmond, and,
notwithstanding the inferiority of his force to that which he was
likely to encounter, he resolved to risk another attempt to
transfer operations to northern soil.
His army now consisted of three corps, under Longstreet, Ewell, and A.
P. Hill. Early in June Ewell was sent into the valley of Virginia
with orders to drive out General Milroy's small force and
advance toward the Potomac. As soon as he had cleared the lower
valley, Longstreet took up his march, moving northward east of
the Blue Ridge, and, in exact fulfillment of General Bee's
expectation, Hooker withdrew from in front of Fredericksburg and
retired to cover and defend Washington, establishing his army
south of the Potomac, near Leesburg, to await the further
development of his adversary's plans. A.P. Hill now followed
Ewell's line of march, and Longstreet also passed into the
valley. Ewell had crossed the Potomac, and Lee followed with the
other two corps, arriving at Chambersburg on 27 June, Ewell being
then at Carlisle.
Stuart, in command of the cavalry, had been left to observe the
enemy, with orders to cross the river and place himself on
Ewell's right as soon as possible after the National army should
have left Virginia. Some discretion was given to him, however,
and in the exercise of it he made a successful march around the
National army, but meantime left Lee without cavalry in an
enemy's country, and without that information of the enemy's
movements which was indispensable to the wise ordering of his
own. Moreover, Stuart's absence misled Lee. Confident that his
cavalry commander, who was a marvel of alertness and promptitude,
would not delay to join him after the passage of the river by the
adversary, Lee argued from his absence that the main body of the
enemy was still south of the river, and perhaps planning a
counter-operation against Richmond, while in fact the entire army
under Meade was hastening toward Gettysburg, where Lee
encountered its advance on 1 July, unexpectedly and under a
complete misapprehension as to its strength, which constituted
Lee's advance, met the enemy first, and was directed to ascertain
his strength, with orders to avoid a general engagement if he
should find anything more than cavalry present. He then undertook
to feel of the force in his front, and, as it consisted of
infantry and artillery in large bodies, he was soon hotly engaged
in spite of his endeavor to confine his operation to a
reconnaissance. When Lee arrived on the field, it was evident
that a general engagement was not to be avoided, and he ordered
up such re-enforcements as were at hand, at the same time sending
directions for the remainder of his forces to hasten forward. Two
divisions of Hill's corps and two of Ewell's were brought into
action, and during the afternoon, after a sharp contest, the
enemy was driven to a position south of the town, where he
occupied a line of hills and awaited a renewal of the
attack.
In the absence of his cavalry, Lee was without any other
information as to the strength or the purposes of his enemy than
that which he could get from the prisoners taken, from whom he
learned that Meade's entire army was approaching. It was
important, if possible, to seize the position held by the enemy
before further bodies of Meade's troops should arrive, as the
line of hills afforded many advantages to the commander who could
occupy it, and Lee directed Ewell to gain possession of it if
possible, leaving him certain discretion, however, in the
exercise of which Ewell delayed the attempt, to await the arrival
of his remaining division, and so the opportunity was lost. It
was Lee's intention to attack with his whole available force on
the morning of the 2d, but it was not until late in the afternoon
that Longstreet, whose troops had been some miles in the rear,
was ready to bear his important part in the assault, and in the
mean time the greater part of Meade's force had arrived and taken
position. The assault was made at four o'clock, with Ewell on the
left, Hill in the centre, and Longstreet on the right. The plan
was for Longstreet to carry the position occupied by the enemy's
left, Ewell and Hill making demonstrations on the left and
centre, but converting their operations into a real attack should
it appear that troops from their front were withdrawn to aid in
opposing Longstreet. This was done, and a part of the enemy's
works was carried by the Confederate left, but relinquished
because of Rhodes's inability to render support to Early as
promptly as had been intended. Meantime Longstreet had forced
back the enemy's left for some distance, and gained a favorable
position for further operations. The day came to an end with no
decisive result, but Lee was encouraged to believe that by a
carefully concerted assault on the next day he might win a
victory that would go far to decide the issue of the war in favor
of the Confederates, or at any rate to compensate for the
continued disasters suffered by the Confederate arms in the west,
and perhaps compel the withdrawal of the National forces from
that quarter for the defense of the middle and eastern states.
The value of such a victory, if he could achieve it, would be
incalculable, and, as Longstreet has declared, the army under
Lee's command at that time "was in condition to
undertake anything."
It was therefore decided to make a supreme effort on the next day
to carry the enemy's position and put him to rout. Longstreet,
strengthened by three brigades under Pickett, and additionally
re-enforced from Hill's corps, was to make the main assault upon
the enemy's right, while Ewell should attack his left and Hill
menace his centre. There was some slight miscarriage in
preparation, however, which resulted in Ewell's becoming engaged
before Longstreet advanced to the assault. Moreover, for reasons
that have since been the subject of somewhat acrimonious
controversy, and the discussion of which would be manifestly
improper in this place, Longstreet's attack was not made with his
entire force, as had been intended; and although by that charge,
which has become historically famous as perhaps the most
brilliant feat of arms performed by Confederates on any field,
Pickett's division succeeded in carrying the hill in their front
and entering the enemy's lines, it was left without adequate
support and was quickly hurled back, broken, and almost
annihilated. This in effect ended the battle of Gettysburg. As at
Antietam, so on this field, no decisive victory had been won by
either army, but Lee's supreme effort had ended in a repulse, and
the advantage rested with the National arms. "It is with
an invading army as with an insurrection: an indecisive action is
equivalent to a defeat." Lee was not driven from the
field, and his army was still unbroken; but he had failed to
overthrow his adversary, and his project of successful invasion
of tile enemy's country was necessarily at an end. He tarried a
day in inactivity, and then retired without, serious molestation
to Virginia, whither Meade followed. The two armies having
returned to the line of the Rapidan, and neither being disposed
to undertake active operations, the campaign of 1863 ended in
August.
The campaign of 1864 was begun by the advance of the
National army under General Grant, who crossed the Rapidan on 4
May with about 120,000 men, including non-combatants, teamsters,
etc. Lee's force at that time was about 66,000 men, not including
commissioned officers, teamsters, and other non-combatants, but
he determined to attack his adversary as quickly as possible.
There followed a succession of stubbornly contested battles and
movements by flank from the Wilderness, where the adversaries
first met, by way of Spottsylvania Court-House and Cold Harbor,
to Petersburg, for an account of which, and of the siege of
Petersburg, see GRANT, ULYSSES S.
|
| General Grant, Lt. Col. Bowers, and General Rawlins at Grant's headquarters, Cold Harbor, 1864 June 11 or 12 |
Grant sat down before Petersburg about the middle of June, and
prepared for a patient siege of that place and of Richmond, to
which it afforded a key. By extending his lines farther and
farther to the south, and pressing his left forward, he forced
Lee to stretch his own correspondingly, until they were drawn out
to dangerous tenuity, there being no source from which the
Confederate commander could draw re-enforcements, while his
already scant force was slowly wasting away under the operations
of the siege. Grant was gradually enveloping the position, and
pushing back the Confederate right, so as to secure the lines of
railway leading to the south, and it was manifestly only a
question of time when Petersburg, and Richmond with it, must fall
into the hands of the enemy. By all military considerations it
was the part of wisdom for the Confederates to withdraw from the
obviously untenable position while there was yet opportunity for
them to retire to the line of the Roanoke, and there is the best
authority for saying that if he had been free to determine the
matter for himself, Lee would have abandoned Richmond many weeks
before the date of its actual fall, and would have endeavored, by
concentration, to win important advantages in the field, where
strategy, celerity of movement, and advantages of position might
offset disparity of forces. But the Confederate government had
decided upon the policy of holding Richmond at all hazards, and
Lee was bound by its decision.
The army, by December of 1864, so dominated the Confederacy that
civilian leaders were unable to block the military's proposal,
strongly endorsed by Lee, to arm and train slaves in Confederate
uniform for combat. In return for this service, slave soldiers
and their families would be emancipated. Lee explained, "We
should employ them without delay ... [along with] gradual and
general emancipation." The first units went into training
just after Robert E. Lee was appointed General-in-Chief,
Armies of the Confederate States.
The end of General Lee's power of resistance came early in the
spring of 1865. Grant broke through his defenses, south of
Petersburg, and compelled the hasty evacuation of the entire
Richmond line on 2 April. Meantime Sherman had
successfully transferred his base from northern Georgia to
Savannah, and was following Johnston in his retreat toward North
Carolina and Virginia. Lee made an ineffectual attempt to retreat
and form a junction with Johnston somewhere south of the Roanoke;
but the head of Grant's column was so far in advance on his left
as to be able to beat him back toward the upper James river,
capturing a large portion of his force, and the small remnant, in
a state of actual starvation, was surrendered on 9 April,
at Appomattox
Court-House, its total strength being fewer than 10,000 men.
|
| "By signing this form, Robert E. Lee and six of his staff officers became paroled prisoners of war and pledged not to take up arms against the United States. The surrender formalities lasted 4 days. On April 9, 1865, Generals Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee met in the parlor of a house in Appomattox Court House, Virginia, to discuss the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. The terms were generous: the men of Lee's army could return home in safety if they pledged to end the fighting and deliver their arms to the Union Army. On April 12, 1865, in a quiet but emotional ceremony, the infantry of Lee's army surrendered their arms, folded their battle flags, and received their parole papers, which guaranteed them safe passage home." -- Form and Text Courtesy of the National Archives. |
General Order No. 9, the Confederate surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia signed by General Robert E. Lee. Dated April 10, 1865. - Historic.us Collection
Transcript
HdQrs Army of No Va10th April 1865 General Order No 9
After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.
I need not tell the brave survivors of so many hard fought battles who have remained steadfast to the last, that I have consented to this result from no distrust of them, But feeling that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the loss that would have attended the continuance of the contest, I determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past services have endeared them to their countrymen.
By the terms of the agreement, Officers and men can return to their homes and remain until exchanged. You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed and I earnestly pray that a merciful God will extend to you His blessing and protection.
With an unceasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous consideration of myself, I bid you all an affectionate farewell.
R E LeeGenl
One month later, General Joseph E. Johnston would surrender the CSA Southern Army to General W.T. Sherman:
|
CSA Circular No. 5, issued by General Vodges and signed by his Aide-de-Camp Headquarters, District of Florida, Dept of the South, Jacksonville, Florida, May 8, 1865. Partial Transcript "It is officially announced to the troops in this District that an agreement has been entered into between General W.T. Sherman commanding U.S. forces and General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding C.S. forces in N.C., for the surrender of the all the C.S. troops in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. The commanders of Posts in this District will therefore conform to the provisions of Special Field Orders No. 65, C.S. from Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, and cease all hostilities and foraging until further orders." Issued to Major Allen, 17th Connecticut Vol, wounded in action at Gettysburg. |
Physically, intellectually, and morally, Lee was a man of large proportions and unusual symmetry. Whether or not he possessed the highest order of genius, he had a mind of large grasp, great vigor and activity, and perfect self-possession. He was modest in his estimate of himself, but not lacking in that self-confidence which gives strength. His mind was pure, and his character upright in an eminent degree. His ruling characteristic was an inflexible devotion to duty, as he understood it, accompanied by a perfect readiness to make any and every sacrifice of self that ,night be required of him by circumstance. In manner he was dignified, courteous, and perfectly simple in temper he was calm, with the placidity of strength that is accustomed to rigid self-control. He was a type of perfectly healthy manhood, in which body and mind are equally under the control of clearly defined conceptions of right and duty. Descended from men who had won distinction by worth, and allied to others of like character, he was deeply imbued with a sense of his obligation to live and act in all things worthily. As a military commander he had thorough knowledge of the art of war, and large ability in its practice. His combinations were sound, and where opportunity permitted, brilliant, and his courage in undertaking great enterprises with scantily adequate means was supported by great skill in the effective employment of such means as were at his command. The tasks he set himself were almost uniformly such as a man of smaller courage would have shrunk from, and a man of less ability would have undertaken only to meet disaster. His military problem was so to employ an inferior force as to baffle the designs of an enemy possessed of a superior one. His great strength lay in that form of defense which involves the employment of offensive maneuvers as a means of choosing the times, places, and conditions of conflict. A military critic has said that he lacked the gift to seize upon the right moment for converting a successful defense into a successful attack, and the judgment appears to be in some measure sound.
Three days after General Lee's death his remains were buried
beneath the chapel of the university at Lexington. in accordance
with his request, no funeral oration was pronounced. The
corner-stone of a monument to his memory was laid in Richmond,
Va., on 27 Oet., 1887. There is a recumbent statue by Valentine
over his grave, and a bronze statue on a column in New Orleans. A
portrait of him was painted from life by John Elder, for the
commonwealth of Virginia, which is now in the senate chamber at
Richmond; another by Elder, for the city of Savannah, is in the
council chamber of that city ; and still another is at the
University of Virginia. The vignette is copied from an early
portrait, while the steel engraving is from a photograph taken in
Richmond, during the last year of the war. General Lee edited,
with a memoir, a new edition of his father's "Memoirs of the Wars
of the Southern Department of the United States" (New York,
1869). See "Life and Campaigns of Robert Edward Lee," by E. Lee
Childe (London, 1875);"Life of Robert E. Lee," by John Esten
Cooke (New York, 1871) ; "Life and Times of Robert E. Lee," by
Edward A. Pollard (1871); "Personal Reminiscences of Robert E.
Lee," by John W. Jones (1874); "Four Years with Gen. Lee," by
Walter H. Taylor (1877)" and "5"lemoirs of Robert E. Lee," by
General A. L. Long (1886). A life of General Lee is now (1887) in
preparation by Col. Charles Marshall, aide - decamp on his staff,
1861-'5, to whom the original papers of General Lee have
been committed by the family.
Mary Randolph Custis Lee, born at, Arlington House, Alexandria co., Va., in 1806; died in Lexington, Va., 6 Nov., 1873, was the only daughter of George Washington Parke Custis, the adopted son of Washington, and the grandson of his wife. In June, 1831, she married Robert E. Lee, by which event he came into possession of Arlington, on the Potomac river, and of the White House, on the Pamunkey. Mrs. Lee had strong intellectual powers, and persistently favored the Confederate cause. She was in Richmond during the civil war, and afterward accompanied her husband to Lexington, where she resided until her death.
1807-1870
Lee's eldest son, George Washington Custis Lee, soldier, born at
Arlington, Va., 16 Sept., 1832, was graduated at the U. S.
military academy in 1854 at the head of his class. He was
commissioned 2d lieutenant of engineers and assigned to the
engineer bureau at Washington. In the spring" of 1855 he was
assigned to duty on Amelia island, Fla., where he was engaged in
constructing the fort at the mouth of St. Mary's river, and in
the autumn of 1857 was ordered to San Francisco, Cal., fox' the
construction of the works at Fort Point. In October, 1859, he was
promoted 1st lieutenant and ordered to the engineer bureau at
Washington, where he remained until the beginning of the civil
war, when he resigned his commission and entered the Confederate
service. He was commissioned major of engineers of the
provisional army of Virginia, 10 May, 1861, and on 1 July was
appointed captain in the Confederate corps of engineers. He
located and constructed the fortifications around Richmond, and
on 31 Aug., 1861, was appointed aide-de-camp to Jefferson Davis,
with the rank of colonel of cavalry.
On 25 June, 1863, he was commissioned brigadier-general and
assigned to a brigade organized for local defense around
Richmond. In the autumn of 1864 he was commissioned major-general
and given the command of a division in the Army of Northern
Virginia, which he led bravely and skillfully till he was
captured at Sailor's Creek. In October, 1865, he became professor
of military and civil engineering and applied mechanics in
Virginia military institute, and in February, 1871. succeeded his
father as president of Washington college (now Washington and Lee
university). Tulane university gave him the degree of LL.D. in
1887.--
His brother, William Henry Fitzhugh Lee, soldier, second son of
Robert E. Lee, born at Arlington, Va., 31 May, 1837, was
graduated at Harvard in 1857, and in the same year appointed 2d
lieutenant in the 6th infantry, U. S. army, and served in the
Utah campaign of General Albert Sidney Johnston, and afterward in
California. Early in 1859 he resigned his commission and took
charge of his farm, the historic White House, on the Pamunkey. In
the spring of 1861 he raised a tawdry company for the Confederate
service, was made captain, and was soon promoted major and made
chief of cavalry to General Loring in the West Virginia campaign.
In the winter of 1861-'2 he was ordered to Fredericksburg and was
made lieutenant-colonel. In the spring of 1862 he was made
colonel, and not long afterward was attached to the brigade of
General J. E. B. Stuart, in most of whose campaigns he
participated. On 3 Oct., 1862, he was made brigadier-general, to
date from 15 Sept. At Brandy Station, 9 June, 1863, he was
severely wounded, and was afterward captured by a raiding party
and carried to Fortress Monroe, where he was held for some time
as a hostage. In the early spring of 1864 he was exchanged, on 23
April was promoted major-general of cavalry, and led his division
in the fights from the Rapidan to Appomattox, where he
surrendered. He soon went to work at the White House, rebuilding
the dwelling, and became a farmer. For some years he was
president of the Virginia agricultural society, in 1875 he was
elected to the state senate, and in 1886 to congress. --
Robert Edward's nephew, Fitzhugh Lee, soldier, b. in Clermont,
Fairfax co., Va., 19 Nov., 1835, was
graduated at the U. S. military academy in 1856, and commissioned
2d lieutenant in the 2d cavalry. He was severely wounded in a
fight with Indians, and in May, 1860, was ordered to report at
West Point as instructor of cavalry. At the beginning of the
civil war in 1861 he resigned his commission and entered the
Confederate service. He was first placed on staff duty, and was
adjutant-general of Ewell's brigade until September, 1861, when
he was made lieutenant-colonel of the 1st Virginia cavalry, and
later was promoted colonel, and he participated in all the
campaigns of the Army of Northern Virginia. On 25 July, 1862, he
was made brigadier-general, and on 3 Sept., 1863, Major-general.
In the battle of Winchester, 19 Sept., 1864, three horses were
shot under him, and he was disabled by a severe wound, which kept
him from duty for several months. In March, 1865, he was put in
command of the whole cavalry corps of the Army of Northern
Virginia, and a month later he surrendered to General Meade at
Farmville, after which he retired to his home in Stafford county.
In 1874 he made a speech at Bunker Hill which attracted wide
attention. In the winter and spring of 1882-'3 he made a tour
through the southern states, in the interest of the Southern
historical society. He was elected governor of Virginia in
1885.-- Edited Appleton's
Cyclopedia American Biography
"It is well that war is so terrible--we would grow too fond of it."
Photo and Text by: National Statuary
Hall
Born into a famous Virginia family on January 19, 1807, Robert E. Lee served his state with great devotion all his life. His family lived at Stratford and later Alexandria, Virginia. At the United States Military Academy he distinguished himself in both scholastics and martial exercises. He was adjutant of the corps and graduated second in the class of 1829. As a career officer, he served in posts in Georgia and Virginia and as commander of the light batteries, with General Scott, in the Mexican War. He served as superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy from 1848 to 1852. Although he was made lieutenant colonel of the Second Cavalry, family problems forced him into inactive duty for over two years. When the South seceded, Lee reluctantly resigned from the army, hoping to avoid participation in the war he deplored. However, a sense of duty to his state made him accept command of the Virginia forces. His successful strategy, his tactical skill, and the confidence of his troops earned him the respect of the Confederate leaders. President Jefferson Davis appointed him commander of the Army of Northern Virginia on April 1, 1862. The next three years demanded all Lee's strength until he was forced to surrender to General Ulysses S. Grant on April 9, 1865. Lee was paroled and accepted the presidency of Washington College (now Washington and Lee) in Lexington, Virginia. He served in that capacity from September 1865 until his death on October 12, 1870.
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18th Century Term
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Age
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Elizabeth "Betty" Harrison Randolph (1745-1783)
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29
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Mary Williams Middleton (1741- 1761) Deceased
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Henry Middleton
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n/a
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05/20/ 75 - 05/24/75
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30
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Dorothy Quincy Hancock Scott (1747-1830)
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05/25/75 – 07/01/76
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28
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United States Continental Congress
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President
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Age
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Dorothy Quincy Hancock Scott (1747-1830)
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07/02/76 – 10/29/77
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29
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Eleanor Ball Laurens (1731- 1770) Deceased
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Henry Laurens
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11/01/77 – 12/09/78
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n/a
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Sarah Livingston Jay (1756-1802)
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21
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Martha Huntington (1738/39–1794)
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41
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United States in Congress Assembled
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President
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Term
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Age
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Martha Huntington (1738/39–1794)
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03/01/81 – 07/06/81
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42
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25
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55
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46
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38
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42
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43
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Christina Stuart Griffin (1751-1807)
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01/22/88 - 01/29/89
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36
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Constitution of 1787
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President
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Term
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April 30, 1789 – March 4, 1797
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March 4, 1797 – March 4, 1801
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Martha Wayles Jefferson Deceased
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September 6, 1782 (Aged 33)
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December 22, 1828 (aged 61)
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February 5, 1819 (aged 35)
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n/a
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65
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50
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23
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60
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42
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Baltimore
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Dec. 20, 1776 to Feb. 27, 1777
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Philadelphia
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March 4, 1777 to Sept. 18, 1777
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Lancaster
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September 27, 1777
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York
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Sept. 30, 1777 to June 27, 1778
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Philadelphia
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July 2, 1778 to June 21, 1783
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Princeton
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June 30, 1783 to Nov. 4, 1783
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Annapolis
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Nov. 26, 1783 to Aug. 19, 1784
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Trenton
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Nov. 1, 1784 to Dec. 24, 1784
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New York City
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Jan. 11, 1785 to Nov. 13, 1788
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New York City
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October 6, 1788 to March 3,1789
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New York City
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March 3,1789 to August 12, 1790
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Philadelphia
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Dec. 6,1790 to May 14, 1800
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Washington DC
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November 17,1800 to Present
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Book a primary source exhibit and a professional speaker for your next event by contacting Historic.us today. Our Clients include many Fortune 500 companies, associations, non-profits, colleges, universities, national conventions, PR and advertising agencies. As a leading national exhibitor of primary sources, many of our clients have benefited from our historic displays that are designed to entertain and educate your target audience. Contact us to learn how you can join our "roster" of satisfied clientele today!
Hosted by The New Orleans Jazz Museum and The Louisiana Historical Center
Hosted by The New Orleans Jazz Museum and The Louisiana Historical Center
Historic.us
A Non-profit Corporation
A Non-profit Corporation
Primary Source Exhibits
727-771-1776 | Exhibit Inquiries
202-239-1774 | Office
202-239-0037 | FAX
Dr. Naomi and Stanley Yavneh Klos, Principals
Naomi@Historic.us
Stan@Historic.us
Primary Source exhibits are available for display in your community. The costs range from $1,000 to $35,000 depending on length of time on loan and the rarity of artifacts chosen.
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| U.S. Dollar Presidential Coin Mr. Klos vs Secretary Paulson - Click Here |
The United Colonies of North America Continental Congress Presidents (1774-1776)
The United States of America Continental Congress Presidents (1776-1781)
The United States of America in Congress Assembled Presidents (1781-1789)
The United States of America Presidents and Commanders-in-Chiefs (1789-Present)
The United States of America Continental Congress Presidents (1776-1781)
The United States of America in Congress Assembled Presidents (1781-1789)
The United States of America Presidents and Commanders-in-Chiefs (1789-Present)
